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“Late have I loved you, beauty so 
old and so new: late have I loved you.” 
St. Augustine, Confessions, Book X 27, 38
I
Introduction – Memory in the Bible
The purpose of this essay is to address a top-
ic which, in my critical judgment, is crucial to 
Christian theology and Christian education, name-
ly, the significance of memory. My aim is to explain 
the central place that memory has in the Christian’s 
journey to God both in Scriptural teaching and in 
the theological reflections of one of the most re-
nowned of the Church Fathers, St. Augustine. In 
an age such as ours, which is dominated by the gen-
erally-accepted opinion that we are progressing into 
the future, remembrance of what has been true—
and may always be true—can be often overlooked 
or even considered a problem that needs to be over-
come. If, however, these biblical and Augustinian 
accounts of the importance of memory in Christian 
teaching cannot be ignored—to say nothing in this 
essay of the need for an appreciation of memory 
in humanistic education generally—we may need 
to reflect anew on the place of memory in our un-
derstanding of faith. The way in which we teach 
the young, whether at home, in school, in colleges 
and universities, or through the types of liturgy we 
use for individual and common prayers, may only 
be revived if we are guided by our understanding 
of the faculty of memory in the soul. Augustine’s 
analysis of memory in the attainment of knowledge 
in Book X of his book the Confessions is a forceful 
account which influenced various writers through-
out the Medieval Period and the Reformation, and 
its epistemological significance only began to be 
replaced with the empirical tradition instituted by 
T. Hobbes, F. Bacon, and J. Locke in the seven-
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teenth century, as part III of this essay indicates. 
Thus, our evaluation of Christian theology, both 
Medieval and Reformed, will require reflection on 
Augustine’s account.1
Given the title of this conference, I could not 
help but notice that the Gospel lesson for the Fourth 
Sunday in Lent, that is, for last Sunday, according 
to the use of the Revised Common Lectionary, is 
the Parable of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15:11-32). It 
may well have been by design that this conference 
received its title because the organizers were aware 
that this parable would be fresh on our minds. This 
“prodigal,” or lavish, even perhaps scandalously lav-
ish, sense of God’s mercy is, it would seem, the ra-
tionale for the title of the conference, even as the 
parable shows the lavish love of the father for the 
son. But the lavish love is also a response to another 
element in the parable, namely, the repentance of 
the son; this Gospel lesson is quite appropriate for 
this season of Lent because the parable is about re-
pentance, and also, to be sure, about rejoicing in 
the repentance, rejoicing in the lavish mercy of the 
father toward the repentant son. The most com-
mon Hebrew word in the Old Testament for repen-
tance is the word šûb (bWv), to return. For example, 
the prophet Hosea says in 3:5, “Afterward, shall the 
children of Israel return (yāšubû, Wbuv'y) and seek the 
Lord their God, and David their king; and shall 
fear the Lord and his goodness in the latter days.” 
Repentance is a going back, a motion of the soul 
and body to acknowledge and to recover what was 
lost. Perhaps what was lost was given away, or per-
haps just neglected, or as in the parable, prodigally 
or lavishly wasted. Yet even if repentance is not and 
perhaps cannot be a recovery of the goods that were 
squandered, it is a recovery of a relationship with 
the father. We can say that in the parable, there 
is no progress in the relationship without return, 
which is why the Hebrew word for repentance is the 
word šûb. The prodigal son’s return is the indica-
tion of his repentance. 
The Old Testament lesson that is paired in the 
Revised Common Lectionary with the Parable of 
the Prodigal’s Son is Joshua 5:9-12, a portion of 
text describing some of the first acts of the children 
of Israel as Joshua leads them through the Jordan 
River. These verses tell us that the children of Israel 
keep the Passover in this land of Canaan, the land 
promised to Abraham just about six hundred years 
previously. The Passover is a “memorial” (wAr'KIZ, 
zikārôn), as it says in Ex. 12:14, a feast to be kept so 
that the community will not forget what wonderful 
works God had done for them. In a few verses prior 
to this lection from Joshua 5, the Israelites select 
twelve representatives, one from each of the twelve 
tribes, who each take a stone from the river bed of 
the Jordan to place in a pile as a “sign” (tAa, ’ ôt) and 
“memorial” (zikārôn) of this entry into the land 
(Josh. 4:6-7). Joshua writes, “When your children 
shall ask their fathers in time to come, saying, What 
mean these stones? Then ye shall let your children 
know, saying, Israel came over this Jordan on dry 
land” (Josh. 4:21-22). In addition, the men who 
crossed over this day were born in the Wilderness 
and had their own reasons for remembering, for 
circumcision had not been practiced in the desert, 
and it is instituted here at Gilgal for the first time in 
forty years (Josh. 5:2-9). The males would not for-
get Gilgal. The Israelites were returning to the land 
of Canaan, not that this specific group had been in 
Canaan, but their ancestors had come from there. 
In various ways, they are to remember the return of 
the nation to the land and, in doing so, to remem-
ber the wondrous deeds of God for the nation both 
in the past and now in the present. To return to 
the land ends the punishment for the hardhearted-
ness of the Wilderness generation, ends the remem-
brance of the need for repentance. As they return to 
the land, the signs and memorials are to be estab-
lished which they will use to remember the events 
of this day in the future. And if we consider again 
briefly the Parable of the Prodigal Son and notice 
what Luke writes at the moment of recognition 
of the prodigal son’s change, we read, “and when 
he came to himself, he said (eis heauton de elthōn 
ephē, εὶς ἑαυτὸν δὲ ἐλθὼν ἔφη)” (vs. 17). This is a 
similar expression in both Greek and English, the 
English rhetoric being formed by the Greek, which 
indicates that something has been lost that needs to 
return; he needs to find himself again, to remember 
himself again, to remember that the servants of his 
father are better off than he. He remembers, and he 
returns, and he repents. These ideas, in scriptural 
sensibility, are concomitant. In Scripture, faithful-
ness is close to remembrance, and forgetfulness is 
close to unbelief. The lavish, the prodigal, love of 
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God is concurrent with the human need to remem-
ber and, in remembering, to return. In these few 
but striking examples in Scripture, lavish mercy 
depends upon repentance, which in turn depends 
upon remembrance. 
II
Augustine on Memory in Book X
Book X of St. Augustine’s Confessions is entitled 
“Memory.” The chapter is perhaps the most deeply 
introspective of the entire book. In the chapter, 
Augustine begins by describing the motives for 
confession. He asks himself how he knows God. 
He seeks this knowledge initially through God’s 
creatures, from the earth to the heavens, but they 
all declare to him that he should love God rather 
than them, for they are signs; they indicate that 
knowledge of him through themselves is not suf-
ficient. Augustine then asks,
Then towards myself I turned, and asked my-
self, “Who are you?” And I answered my own 
question: “A man.” See, here are the body and 
soul that make up myself, the one outward 
and the other within. Through which of these 
should I seek my God? With my body’s senses I 
had already sought him from earth to heaven, to 
the farthest place whither I could send the dart-
ing rays of my eyes; but what lay within me was 
better, and to this all those bodily messengers 
reported back, for it controlled and judged the 
replies of sky and earth, and of all the creatures 
dwelling in them, all those who had proclaimed, 
“We are not God” and “He made us.” My in-
ner self recognized them all through the service 
of the outer. I who was the inmost self, I, who 
was mind, knew them through the senses of my 
body; and so I questioned the vast frame of the 
world concerning my God, and it answered, “I 
am not he, but he made me” (6, 9).2
“But what lay within me was better,” he says in 
this quotation; and in the next section he says, “By 
this same soul I will mount to him” rather than 
through the creatures in the world. Reason is able 
to teach Augustine that the images of the creatures 
of God are surpassed by “what lay within.”
 At this point we might expect Augustine to 
elaborate on his account of the relation between the 
senses and the mind in his ascent to God. We know 
from earlier parts of the Confessions that it is the 
very existence of mathematics, the incorporeal ab-
stractions of mathematics, that convince him that 
the materialism of the Manichaeans is bogus. The 
recognition of incorporeality had already been rec-
ognized by Augustine but is not this truth to which 
he turns in the argument. At this point in Book X, 
he turns to memory. In memory, he says, “there I 
come to meet myself” (8, 14).3 He is amazed at the 
vast resources of memory; in fact, he says they are 
“exceedingly great, a vast, infinite recess” (8, 15).4 
He says we may travel far to see high mountains 
and crashing waterfalls and so on, but we are able 
in an instant to recall these in memory. And when 
we ask whether something exists, or what it is, or 
what qualities it has, we may have sensory images 
of them, but we do not grasp the thing only with 
images of these attributes. He says “But through 
no bodily sense whatever have I made contact with 
the realities themselves, for I have never seen these 
realities anywhere except in my own mind (neque 
ullo sensu corporis attigi neque uspiam vidi praeter 
animum meum)” (10,17).5 It is these things them-
selves, not images of them, that are stored up in 
memory. He continues,
What I have stowed away in my memory is 
not the images of these things but the things 
themselves. Let them say how they found their 
way into me if they can, for when I check every 
physical gateway in myself I find none by which 
they can have entered. My eyes tell me, “If those 
things were colored, it was we who reported 
them”; my ears declare, “If they made some 
sound, we gave you the information”; [and so 
on for the five senses]. From what source and 
by what route did they [the things themselves] 
enter my memory? I do not know, for when 
I learned them I did not take them on trust 
from some stranger’s intelligence but recog-
nized them as present in my own, and affirmed 
them as true, and entrusted them to my mem-
ory for safekeeping so that I could bring them 
out again when I wished. This means that they 
were there even before I learned them, but not 
remembered. Where and why did I recognize 
them and say, “Yes, that’s how it is; that is true,” 
when these things were stated? Surely because 
they were already in my memory, but so remote, 
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so hidden from sight in concealed hollows, that 
unless they had been dug out by someone who 
reminded me, I would perhaps never have been 
able to think about them (10,17).6
The “things themselves,” as is translated here by 
Maria Boulding, or as she translates elsewhere, the 
“realities themselves,” are not simply sense images 
even if the categories of their corporeal being—
quantity, quality, place, relation and so on—are 
images from our senses; they themselves are oth-
er than that. Chadwick’s 
translation will use both 
“realities” and “ideas” as the 
subject in this context, terms 
which also assert that these 
are things in themselves and 
are not identical to sense 
perceptions.7 Someone such 
as a teacher or the speeches from a book may be 
necessary to be the catalyst to dig them out of the 
concealed hollows of our memory; yet the exter-
nal agent will do nothing more than remind us of 
what is there rather than add anything new. For 
Augustine, the mind is no tabula rasa but a vast, 
even infinite, recess of realities awaiting to be awak-
ened through memory.8 
In the next section he writes, 
We are therefore led to conclude that when we 
learn things which are not imbibed through the 
senses as images, but are known directly in their 
own reality inside the mind, as they are in them-
selves, and without the intervention of images, 
we are collecting by means of our thought those 
things which the memory already held, but in 
a scattered and disorderly way. By applying our 
minds to them we ensure that they are stacked 
ready-to-hand in the memory, where they may 
be easily available for habitual use, instead of ly-
ing hidden, dispersed and neglected, as hitherto 
(11, 18).9
Those “things” are that which the memory al-
ready held independently of sense perception. As 
these things are recalled to the memory, we can say 
that we learn them because this is what learning is, 
nothing else. When we wish to recall them again, 
we may need to pull them from the places as if they 
are being newly thought out, but they are present 
and are not actually new. As they are pulled out, 
they are, he says, 
… herded together to become knowable once 
more: that is to say they need to be collected 
again, which is why we call this activity cogitat-
ing, or collecting one’s thoughts. Cogo is related 
to cogito as ago is to agito and facio to factito. The 
mind, however, has claimed this verb [cogito] as 
properly applicable to itself, so that only what 
is “collected,” within the mind, what is “herded 
together” there, and there only, is properly said 
to be “thought” (11, 18).10
Augustine uses Latin 
stem variations to elucidate 
his point. Cogo is the verb 
to collect; cogito is derivative 
from cogo and is the verb 
to think. The parallels with 
other verbs with similar derivative forms assist 
Augustine’s philological point. Ago is the verb to put 
in motion, move; agito is a derivative stem verb to set 
in violent motion, drive onward. Agito is an intensifi-
cation of ago, a meaning that is achieved in English 
with the use of the adverb violent. Facio is the verb 
to make, to construct; factitio is a derivative stem verb 
to do frequently, do habitually. The derivative stem is 
also an intensification of the verb, a meaning again 
in English that is achieved through an adverb, in 
this case with the idea of frequency. Augustine thus 
demonstrates that the verb cogo is the stem verb and 
cogito is a derivative stem verb; however, the mean-
ing of cogito is not to be understood as an intensi-
fication or continuation, as is the case with these 
other two stem variations, because something qual-
itatively different is intended between collecting and 
thinking. Augustine says the mind has claimed the 
derivative verb stem cogito and given it a meaning 
qualitatively other than intensification or continu-
ation. Thus, although the pattern between the cog-
nate stems is identical among the three sets of verbs, 
cogito means to think rather than to collect hurriedly 
or to collect vigorously, that is, with some type of 
intensification. Yet, we ought to credit cogo, collect-
ing, as an intellectual process; it is the initial process 
which prepares for and will pass into thinking. The 
mind comes to think by collecting, or in the shep-
herding metaphor of herding together, and what is 
Those “things” are that 
which the memory already 
held independently of sense 
perception.
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this collecting but the remembering of what is in the 
mind. To learn, for Augustine, is to remember, and 
learning will not take place without remembering.
At this point (12, 19) Augustine uses the ar-
gument from mathematics, an argument that is 
not used for the first time here in the Confessions. 
The laws of mathematics, he says, have no color, 
nor sound, nor smell nor can they be tasted nor 
touched. The stated laws may sound one way in 
Greek and another in Latin, but these sounds are 
not the laws; he says “the mathematical lines they 
represent are something quite different, not the im-
ages of the lines which my fleshly eye has observed” 
(12,19).11 And in the same context, he says, “The 
principle [of number] is not an image of the things 
counted, and therefore has a much more real exis-
tence” (12, 19).12 Memory is more than a repository 
of sense perceptions which we recall when we are 
able. The incorporeal, mathematical realities are in 
the memory, and learning is to bring them to recol-
lection. Augustine proceeds in the next section to 
affirm the importance of this recognition. He says 
that mind and memory are the same: “the person 
who remembers is myself; I am my mind (ego sum, 
qui memini, ego animus)” (14, 21).13 There is no 
mind without memory. Memory is not some por-
tion of the mind which the mind uses or does not 
use as it sees fit. Without the operations of memory, 
there can be no science, no scientia, whether the sci-
ence be natural philosophy, theology, or the reading 
of the narrative, legal texts, or parables of Scripture.
III
Memory, Education and Liturgy 
in Our Context
It is not difficult to contrast this Augustinian 
account with that of the empirical tradition of the 
early seventeenth century. In the opening sections 
of Part I of Thomas Hobbes Leviathan, it takes little 
time at all for Hobbes to dispense with thoughts 
not derived from senses and to diminish the im-
portance of memory for knowledge because they 
are only weakened and decaying sense percep-
tions.14 If ever-new sense perceptions are what mat-
ter, why settle for decaying percepts in the memory. 
Hobbes’s stated opponent is Aristotle. In Chapter 
I, “Of Sense,” Hobbes says “The Originall of them 
all [by which he means thoughts], is that which we 
call Sense; (For there is no conception in a mans 
[sic] mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by 
parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The 
rest are derived from the originall.”15 In Chapter 2, 
“Of Imagination,” Hobbes says that it is due to the 
transitoriness of our lives that our memories are 
dim. I quote: 
… our imagination of the Past is weak; and 
wee lose (for example) of Cities wee have seen, 
many particular Streets; and of Actions, many 
particular Circumstances. This decaying sense, 
when wee would express the thing it self, (I 
mean fancy it selfe,) wee call Imagination, as I 
said before: but when we would express the de-
cay, and signify that the Sense is fading, old and 
past, it is called Memory. So that the Imagina-
tion and Memory, are but one thing, which for 
divers considerations hath divers names.16 
Even though in Augustine, memories may be 
hidden and tucked away in crevices, they are not 
fading, old, past, and decaying. They wait, un-
changed and unchangeable, ever to be recalled. 
With Hobbes the empirical tradition is upon us, 
and memory is of little consequence. External sen-
sation is all.
In regard to education, the emphasis of the em-
pirical tradition will be on what comes to us by way 
of the senses and is in contrast to the guidance we 
gain from Augustine. According to the empirical 
tradition, these sensations need to be always re-
freshed to capture and satisfy our interests because 
they can and do decay as they exist as imaginings 
and memories. The aims of Hobbes’s account of 
science and of education will inevitably be on the 
outward rather than inward, and the interiority of 
Augustine’s account of knowledge is dismissed. In 
Hobbes’s opinion of education, a lot depends on the 
teacher and the external stimuli. In Augustine, in 
contrast, education is focused on the inward, upon 
a recognition that the teacher does not create what 
is remembered, but points it out as already there in 
one’s thought and above all allows the individual 
to awaken himself or herself, perhaps in the man-
ner of the prodigal son, “when he came to himself.” 
Augustine’s strategy would not lead to a dizzying 
practice of learning by rote because that would be 
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close to the notion that the process is primarily ex-
ternal, something impressed upon the student from 
the outside, perhaps by a frustrated teacher. For 
Augustine, reading and study, including observa-
tion, in order to create an ease of familiarity would 
be closer to the mark of what learning should look 
like. For Augustine, the process of learning would 
require us to read, then close the book, and recol-
lect in tranquility the math problem, the process 
we witnessed in nature, or the plot of the novel. 
Learning for Augustine respects the faculties and 
intelligence of the student 
rather than relying upon the 
external stimulation of the 
teacher. Augustine would be 
apt to say to a student, ‘Look 
what you already know?’ or 
‘Do you remember what we 
recognized previously?’  
Augustine’s account at 
least historically has had a 
positive impact on educa-
tion in the Church, espe-
cially through the liturgy. Augustine’s account in 
Book X of cogo and cogito, of collecting and thinking, 
explains the long-standing use in the prayers of the 
Church of what we still call “collects.” Collects are 
those short prayers, often at the beginning of our 
prayers and at the end, which gather, or herd togeth-
er, our thoughts so that we can be led to cogitation, 
to knowing. The herding together, or collecting, of 
our thoughts depends on familiarity gained over 
time, familiarity based on memory, and reawak-
ened regularly in our daily, weekly, and seasonal 
liturgies. Christian formation of character, spiritual 
and moral, if indeed Augustine is correct—and in 
my critical judgment he seems closer than the al-
ternatives—will require memory. No minister or 
priest has been in the presence of a dying person 
whose intellectual sensibilities are failing without 
recognizing that the deepest memories, such as 
those of the Lord’s Prayer, Psalm 23, and of hymns 
or psalms sung to plainsong or the Genevan Psalter, 
are the last connections with this world to be lost. 
These deepest recollections are also entrances to 
the world of light. To push the argument further, 
how can these collects of the Church be understood 
without Augustine’s account of memory? Their 
maturity of theology and richness of phraseology, 
collected from phrases of Scripture, may not be 
immediately understood upon first acquaintance, 
especially if we are young. But they will become 
familiar, will be remembered and recollected, and 
shape and guide us more deeply, I think, than 
Joshua’s stones.
But there is also a shift away from spiritual for-
mation in the accounts of education based upon 
the empiricism of such writers as Hobbes. There is a 
movement away from the language of well-written 
texts, which are used with 
sufficient frequency so that 
they are known by large 
numbers of the congrega-
tion regardless of education 
level and vocation in life, 
to spontaneously-created 
prayers and “orders” of ser-
vice whose guiding principle 
is variety or innovation. If 
Augustine is correct that “I 
am my mind” and “Mind is 
memory,” we need to ponder indeed whether mind 
is really more in existence in our post-Hobbesian 
context than in a world shaped by Augustine, or 
if in fact what Hobbes leaves us with is some trun-
cated version of mind. And if too, as Augustine as-
serts, memory is the way in which the soul ascends 
to God, our diminishment of memory separates us 




I began this study with reflections on bibli-
cal texts in order to draw attention to the signifi-
cance of memory in biblical sensibility; memory 
in Scripture is close to the notion of faithfulness. 
Even as Israel was expected to look at those memo-
rial stones piled up on the side of the river, stones 
which had been rounded off from years of flow-
ing water over them when they lay in the river 
bed of the Jordan, so we are to recognize that in 
remembrance of the wondrous events depicted in 
Scripture, in the sacraments, and in God’s presence 
in us, we can ascend in the knowledge of God. The 
The ascent to God through 
mind, that is, through 
memory, is the journey 
we have too prodigally 
squandered and to which we 
need to return to in order to 
find our true home.
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way in which we can find ourselves, as the prodigal 
son did, is through memory. We can, like him, re-
turn, repent, and learn the meaning of knowledge 
and rejoicing. The ascent to God through mind, 
that is, through memory, is the journey we have 
too prodigally squandered and to which we need to 
return to in order to find our true home. Christian 
liturgy, which ought to be the best words in the 
best order for the best herding, or collecting together, 
of our recollections, remains a vital way forward for 
the rediscovery of what has been there for and in us 
all the time. As Augustine writes in this chapter on 
memory, “Late have I loved you, beauty so old and 
so new: Late have I loved you.” It took memory for 
Augustine to realize that beauty was ever old and 
ever new. 
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